The Boer campaign on the Western Front When the Anglo-Boer War broke out Col. R.S. Baden-powell and a small British force were stationed at Mafeking. This force was connected by railway to the force at Kimberley under the command of Col. R.G. Kekewich. The siege of Mafeking The Boers’s plan was to attack Mafeking with commandos from the Transvaal, Kimberley and the Free State. The Transvaal commandos in the west were led by Gen. P.A. Cronj', with Gen. J.H. De la Rey second in command. Gen. Cronj' differed from Gen Joubert in a number of aspects. He was a fighter by nature and confronted the British fearlessly. However, he was also stubborn and very seldom if ever accepted advice. This trait eventually led to his downfall. The railway connection between Mafeking and Kimberley was Cronje’s first target. This he destroyed on 12 October 1899 during the first battle of the Anglo-Boer War. From there he went on to besiege Mafeking. (Some historians claim that it would have been fairly easy for Cronj' to occupy the town by a charge of his mounted commando. However, he chose to besiege the town.) As is clear today, the decision to besiege Mafeking turned out to be a big mistake. A large number of Boers were kept from fighting elsewhere. Baden-Powell moreover had no desire to surrender the town and decided to endure the hardships of a siege by keeping the Boers busy. By doing this he did the British cause a great service since the situation on the western front soon changed to the detriment of the Boers. The siege of Kimberley The Free State commandos made an equally big mistake by besieging Kimberley instead of occupying the town. As was the case with Mafeking, the siege kept a large number of Boers from service elsewhere where their numbers could have made a difference. These commandos could have penetrated the Cape Colony and in so doing could have removed the fighting from the borders of the Boer Republics. The area to the south of the Free State border contained the important railway connection between De Aar and Noupoort, and was not occupied by any large British force. It was also mainly occupied by people who were sympathetic to the Boer cause. In the long run the Boers’ failing to make use of their opportunities gave the advantage to the British forces. As mentioned in the previous edition of Victorian Corner, the British Offensive in Natal ended in their defeat. The same can be said about their offensive on the western and the Cape fronts. Gen. Lord Methuen and his 8 500 men's advance towards Kimberley was made easy the fact that the Boers did not penetrate the Cape Colony far. Methuen therefore could move his troops by rail to the Orange River. Belmont The first battle between Methuen's force and the Boers took place on 23 November 1899 at Belmont Station. Here 2500 Boers had dug themselves in and waited for the British to arrive. Within a few hours on the 23rd the British succeeded in driving the Boers from their positions and forced them to fall back northwards. Graspan The Republican forces falling back were reinforced by a number of commandos that came with Gen. De la Rey from Kimberley. They took up position at Graspan where Methuen attacked them on the 25th November 1899. This time Methuen used his artillery to bombard the Boer positions first. This, combined with the attack of his infantry, made life unbearable for the Boers who retreated within a few hours. Modder River The retreating Boer force were reinforced by a few thousand men arriving with Gen. Cronje from Mafeking. Cronje assumed command and took up position on the banks of the Modder River, where Methuen attacked for the third time on 28 November 1899. Being in a better defensive position this time, the Boers kept up a withering fire on their advancing enemy. This resulted in heavy casualties on British side. Methuen's forces however succeeded in breaking through the Boer lines and crossing the river. Some of the Boer commandos came under the impression that they would not be able to stand their ground against the British and began to leave their positions. This in turn forced Cronje to evacuate the battleground after nightfall, without the British noticing. Magersfontein The casualties he suffered were so heavy that Methuen had to wait for reinforcements to arrive before he could continue towards Kimberley. This gave the Republican forces the ample time to dig a network of trenches below the hills at Magersfontein. On 10 December 1899 Methuen attacked again. At midnight some regiments - mainly Scottish - moved out in preparation of an attack on the Boers at dawn. The dark, combined with rainy weather, soon sowed confusion amongst these regiments as it was difficult to maintain their formations. Alerted by the sound of the advancing regiments the Boers patiently waited for first light before starting their attack. At four o'clock on 11 December the first shots rang out from the Boer Mausers. The Scottish, with their colourful uniforms, were easy targets and soon the number of dead and wounded on British side increased sharply. At four o'clock that afternoon Methuen called off the attack. His casualties amounted to nearly a thousand men being dead or wounded. The defeat at Magersfontein made Methuen decide not to mount any further attempts to free Kimberley. Thereupon a silence, that lasted until February 1900, settled over the Western Front.